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A Two Stage Investigation of the Determinants of 
Information Systems Outsourcing 
K. Nam*, S. Rajagopalan*, H.R. Rao*, and A. Chaudhury!  
* State University of New York at Buffalo  
! University of Massachusetts, Boston  
Outsourcing has recently emerged as a key method of managing Information Systems 
especially since the report about Eastman Kodak and IBM's outsourcing partnership in 
1989 (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992a, 1992b). The importance of outsourcing is partially 
illustrated by the fact that there are myriad conflicting arguments both for and against 
outsourcing (Chaudhury et al, 1989, 1995; Gantz, 1990; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; 
Nam et al, 1995a, 1995b).  
Most outsourcing studies have focused on the investigation of the determinants of the 
decision to outsource by clients. Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory has recently 
been used in the study of the determinants of outsourcing (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; 
Nam et al, 1995a, 1995b). The theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) was originally 
formulated to address the "make" versus "buy" choice (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; 
Erramilli and Rao, 1993)  
In TCE, Williamson (1989, 1987, 1981, 1979) proposed that firms should insource when 
they expect opportunistic behavior by the vendors. In particular when clients are locked-
in with vendors, vendors' opportunistic behavior will significantly impair the clients' 
interests. This statement implies that attributes of existing relationships such as 
opportunism affect the firms' subsequent "make-or-buy" decision with the incumbent 
vendors. However, most prior empirical research on TCE has treated each sourcing 
decision as an independent event (Masten, 1984; Walker and Walker, 1987, 1984) 
thereby disregarding the prior relationships that affect the subsequent sourcing decisions. 
Therefore, any outsourcing study must explicitly incorporate the role of prior ties in its 
analytical framework (Gulati, 1995).  
In the outsourcing context, it has been reported that very often clients continue their 
relationships with vendors. Also, many firms have to decide whether they should 
continue the outsourcing relationships with the vendors or not. Factors that affect 
continuation of the relationships are different from factors that affect the initial 
outsourcing behavior because client firms have locked-in relationships with vendors. 
According to Seabright et al (1992), and Levinthal et al (1988), prior relationships need 
to be investigated in order to study the subsequent relationships between clients and 
vendors. This study will focus on i) the determinants of the outsourcing decisions and ii) 
the tendency to persist in the locked-in outsourcing relationship.  
We investigate the factors that determine outsourcing decisions in two stages. In the first 
stage, both insourcing and outsourcing firms are studied to investigate the determinants 
of "make-or-buy" decision. In the second stage, only outsourcing firms are considered in 
order to study the intention to continue with the relationship.  
Two dimensions are proposed in order to conceptualize the diverse types of outsourcing 
between clients and vendors (Nam et al, 1994a, 1994b). The first dimension is the extent 
of substitution by IS vendors and the second dimension is the strategic impact of IS 
applications. There are two types of strategic impact of IS applications: differentiation 
and cost reduction. The first dimension is proposed from the IS vendors' point of view 
while the second dimension is proposed from the client firms' point of view. Based on 
these two dimensions, four types of outsourcing relationships are proposed. These four 
types are support, reliance, alignment, and alliance.  
The support cell has a low extent of substitution and low strategic impact. This cell 
corresponds to the traditional IS vendors service. Vendors are usually restricted to non-
core IS activities and the size of contract is small. The reliance cell has a high extent of 
substitution and low strategic impact. The IBM and Kodak outsourcing example 
corresponds to this cell. In recent years, the trend of outsourcing has moved from the 
support cell to the reliance cell. The alignment cell has a low extent of substitution and 
high strategic impact. Examples in this cell are mostly IS consulting types of services. 
Even though vendors are not significantly involved with client firms' IS operations, IS 
vendors significantly influence clients' IS operations. The alliance cell has a high extent 
of substitution and high strategic impact. Outside vendors not only substitute in-house IS 
operations but also contribute to clients' competitive advantages through provision of 
important IS functional activities.  
In the first stage, hypotheses are developed based on transaction and non-transaction cost 
factors with respect to the two proposed outsourcing dimensions. Three transaction cost 
factors are studied as determinants of the two dimensions: asset specificity, uncertainty, 
potential number of vendors. Four non-transaction cost factors are also investigated. 
These four non-TCE factors are IT competency, IS influence, heterogeneity of 
information systems, and decision analysis effort. Multiple regressions are used to test 
hypotheses in the first stage.  
In the second stage, hypotheses are proposed based on prior relationships between clients 
and vendors in order to study the determinants of the intention to continue with the 
outsourcing relationships. Prior relationships are represented by the four types of 
outsourcing relationships based on two dimensions of outsourcing, vendors performance 
in terms of client satisfaction, vendors' opportunistic behavior and the length of prior 
relationships. Logistic regression is employed to test hypotheses in the second stage.  
Questionnaires were developed based on interviews with IS manager and pretested. 
Following a pretest, 800 questionnaires were sent to senior IS managers in the U.S. A 
follow-up letter was mailed to those who had not responded after about three weeks.  
In total 154 usable questionnaires were received representing a response rate of 19.25%. 
Out of 154, 93 responded as outsourcing firms and 61 responded as insourcing firms.  
Results  
In the first stage the results indicate that asset specificity, IT competency, and decision 
analysis effort have positive impact on the differentiation aspect of the strategic impact of 
IS applications. However, when the focus is on cost reduction, none of the three factor is 
significant. For the extent of substitution, uncertainty has a negative impact, 
heterogeneity of IS systems has a positive impact, IT competency has a negative impact, 
size of firm has a positive impact. Results are summarized in Table 1.  
For the second stage, three dummy variables are employed in order to compare the 
intention to continue with the relationship in the four cells. The results indicate that 
outsourcing relationships in the reliance and alignment cells are more likely to persist 
compared with relationships in the support cell. However, outsourcing relationships in 
the alliance cell are not likely to persist compared to relationships in other cells. Clients' 
satisfaction has a positive impact and vendors' opportunistic behavior has a negative 
impact on the persistence of the relationships. The duration of prior relationships do not 
affect the persistence of relationships between vendors and clients. Results are 
summarized in Table 2.  
Discussion  
In the first stage, the results (see Table 1) indicate that only one TCE factor, uncertainty, 
is significant while other two factors, asset specificity, and potential number of vendors, 
are not significant. These results are not consistent with the theory of TCE. The most 
possible reason deals with the nature of TCE. Gulati(1995) argued that there are two 
types of governance structures: equity and nonequity ownership. Nonequity ownership 
does not involve the sharing or exchange of equity, nor does it entail the creation of a 
new organizational entity. In contrast, equity based ownership requires a capital 
commitment from both parties or one party, and the transaction cost factors are signified 
by the capital commitment. Thereby, application of TCE to outsourcing may not be as 
satisfactory as application to other equity-type governance modes unless it requires 
equity ownership. If outsourcing practices are more equity-based, more consistent results 
would be obtained.  
In the first stage, IT competency and heterogeneity of information systems are more 
significant factors than uncertainty and size of firms. IT competency and heterogeneity of 
information systems are systems-related factors, while uncertainty is an environment-
related factor and size of firms is an organization-related factor. It is inferred that even 
though environmental and organizational factors affect the decision of outsourcing, major 
determinants of outsourcing are systems-related.  
There are several important findings in the second stage with respect to four cells. The 
first finding is concerned with the two types of strategic impact, cost reduction and 
differentiation. Regardless of whether outsourcing vendors are involved in cost reduction 
functions or differentiation functions, same factors affect the persistence of relationships.  
The second finding is relevant to the current trend of outsourcing. The trend of 
outsourcing relationships is a movement from the support cell to the reliance cell or 
alignment cell.  
The third finding is with regard to the future trend of outsourcing. One of the most 
interesting issues in outsourcing is whether outsourcing for strategic functions is a good 
practice or not. This question is equivalent to asking whether the alliance cell is a good 
and viable option for client firms to be in. The study indicates that outsourcing 
relationships tend to persist when either the strategic impact of outsourced IS activities or 
the extent of substitution by vendors is high. It implies that outsourcing vendors are 
successful in reliance and alignment cells regardless of whether IS applications are for 
cost reduction or differentiation. However, when both  
Table 1. Hypotheses Testing in the First Stage  
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Level of Significance: *** for p=0.01, ** for p=0.05, and * for p=0.1 
Size = LOG (Sales)  
the strategic impact and the extent of substitution by vendors are high, there is no 
evidence of a tendency to persist in the relationship. It implies that current practice of 
outsourcing for the alliance cell is not stable enough for existing relationships to persist. 
Hence, the factors that affect the persistence of relationships in the alliance cell should be 
further investigated.  
The fourth finding provides interesting implications for IS vendors. In this study, 
vendors' performance was represented by two factors: opportunistic behavior and 
satisfaction with vendors. Satisfaction with vendors was operationalized in terms of 
vendors' technical competency. A further investigation of the chi-square values for each 
variable from individual logistic regression indicates that both factors are almost equally 
important in determining the persistence of existing relationships. This implies that IS 
vendors should be sound in terms of technical competency and relationships.  
The fifth finding is concerned with duration. The result indicates that duration of prior 
relationships has no effect on the persistence of outsourcing relationships. According to 
TCE, duration is one of important factors that affect the types of contract as well as future 
relationships between vendors and clients. However, it is found that long-term prior 
relationships do not guarantee the persistence of outsourcing relationships at all.  
This study contributes in three ways: First, transaction cost economic theory is enhanced 
with the non-TCE factors and is used to investigate two  
Table 2. Hypotheses Testing in the Second Stage  
• Out of 93 outsourcing firms, 15 firms who do not have a specific plan were 
dropped from the analysis. Therefore, 78 firms were used for analysis.  
• 78 firms were categorized into four cells by median values of each dimension.  
• Since the dimension of strategic impact is operationalized in two ways, the 
samples are categorized in two ways. The first column shows the result for 
strategic differentiation and the second column is for cost reduction.  



















Chi-Square 24.258 23.331 
Level of Significance: *** for p=0.01, ** for p=0.05, and * for p=0.1  
dimensions. Second, diverse outsourcing relationships are conceptualized by two 
dimensions and four types of outsourcing relationships. Third, it investigates the 
tendency to continue with existing relationships.  
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